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Abstract—Differential privacy is a strong notion for protecting individual privacy in privacy preserving data analysis or
publishing. In this paper, we study the problem of differentially private histogram release for random workloads. We study two
multidimensional partitioning strategies including: 1) a baseline cell-based partitioning strategy for releasing an equi-width cell
histogram, and 2) an innovative 2-phase kd-tree based partitioning strategy for releasing a v-optimal histogram. We formally
analyze the utility of the released histograms and quantify the errors for answering linear queries such as counting queries.
We formally characterize the property of the input data that will guarantee the optimality of the algorithm. Finally, we implement
and experimentally evaluate several applications using the released histograms, including counting queries, classification, and
blocking for record linkage and show the benefit of our approach.
Index Terms—Differential privacy, non-interactive data release, histogram, classification, record linkage.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As information technology enables the collection, stor-
age, and usage of massive amounts of information
about individuals and organizations, privacy becomes
an increasingly important issue. Governments and
organizations recognize the critical value in sharing
such information while preserving the privacy of
individuals. Privacy preserving data analysis and data
publishing [3], [4], [5] has received considerable atten-
tion in recent years. There are two models for privacy
protection [3]: the interactive model and the non-
interactive model. In the interactive model, a trusted
curator (e.g. hospital) collects data from record owners
(e.g. patients) and provides an access mechanism for
data users (e.g. public health researchers) for querying
or analysis purposes. The result returned from the
access mechanism is perturbed by the mechanism
to protect privacy. In the non-interactive model, the
curator publishes a “sanitized” version of the data,
simultaneously providing utility for data users and
privacy protection for the individuals represented in
the data.
Differential privacy [6], [7], [3], [5], [8] is widely
accepted as one of the strongest known privacy guar-
antees with the advantage that it makes few as-
sumptions on the attacker’s background knowledge.
It requires the outcome of computations to be for-
mally indistinguishable when run with or without
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any particular record in the dataset, as if it makes
little difference whether an individual is being opted
in or out of the database. Many meaningful results
have been obtained for the interactive model with
differential privacy [6], [7], [3], [5]. Non-interactive
data release with differential privacy has been recently
studied with hardness results obtained and it remains
an open problem to find efficient algorithms for many
domains [9], [10].
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Fig. 1. Differentially private histogram release
In this paper, we study the problem of differen-
tially private histogram release based on a differential
privacy interface, as shown in Figure 6. A histogram
is a disjoint partitioning of the database points with
the number of points which fall into each partition.
A differential privacy interface, such as the Privacy
INtegrated Queries platform (PINQ) [11], provides
a differentially private access to the raw database.
An algorithm implementing the partitioning strategy
submits a sequence of queries to the interface and
generates a differentially private histogram of the raw
database. The histogram can then serve as a sanitized
synopsis of the raw database and, together with an
optional synthesized dataset based on the histogram,
can be used to support count queries and other types
of OLAP queries and learning tasks.
An immediate question one might wonder is what
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2is the advantage of the non-interactive release com-
pared to using the interactive mechanism to answer
the queries directly. A common mechanism providing
differentially private answers is to add carefully cali-
brated noise to each query determined by the privacy
parameter and the sensitivity of the query. The com-
posability of differential privacy [11] ensures privacy
guarantees for a sequence of differentially-private
computations with additive privacy depletions in the
worst case. Given an overall privacy requirement or
budget, expressed as a privacy parameter, it can be
allocated to subroutines or each query in the query
sequence to ensure the overall privacy. When the
number of queries grow, each query gets a lower pri-
vacy budget which requires a larger noise to be added.
When there are multiple users, they have to share a
common privacy budget which degrades the utility
rapidly. The non-interactive approach essentially ex-
ploits the data distribution and the query workload
and uses a carefully designed algorithm or query
strategy such that the overall noise is minimized for a
particular class of queries. As a result, the partitioning
strategy and the algorithm implementing the strategy
for generating the query sequence to the interface
are crucial to the utility of the resulting histogram or
synthetic dataset.
Contributions. We study differentially private his-
togram release for random query workload in this
paper and propose partitioning and estimation algo-
rithms with formal utility analysis and experimental
evaluations. We summarize our contributions below.
• We study two multidimensional partitioning
strategies for differentially private histogram re-
lease: 1) a baseline cell-based partitioning strategy
for releasing an equi-width cell histogram, and
2) an innovative 2-phase kd-tree (k-dimensional
tree) based space partitioning strategy for releas-
ing a v-optimal histogram. There are several inno-
vative features in our 2-phase strategy. First, we
incorporate a uniformity measure in the partition-
ing process which seeks to produce partitions that
are close to uniform so that approximation er-
rors within partitions are minimized, essentially
resulting in a differentially private v-optimal his-
togram. Second, we implement the strategy using
a two-phase algorithm that generates the kd-tree
partitions based on the cell histogram so that
the access to the differentially private interface
is minimized.
• We formally analyze the utility of the released
histograms and quantify the errors for answer-
ing linear distribute queries such as counting
queries. We show that the cell histogram provides
bounded query error for any input data. We
also show that the v-optimal histogram combined
with a simple query estimation scheme achieves
bounded query error and superior utility than
existing approaches for “smoothly” distributed
data. We formally characterize the “smoothness”
property of the input data that guarantees the
optimality of the algorithm.
• We implement and experimentally evaluate sev-
eral applications using the released histograms,
including counting queries, classification, and
blocking for record linkage. We compare our
approach with other existing privacy-preserving
algorithms and show the benefit of our approach.
2 RELATED WORKS
Privacy preserving data analysis and publishing has
received considerable attention in recent years. We
refer readers to [3], [4], [5] for several up-to-date
surveys. We briefly review here the most relevant
work to our paper and discuss how our work differs
from existing work.
There has been a series of studies on interactive
privacy preserving data analysis based on the notion
of differential privacy [6], [7], [3], [5]. A primary
approach proposed for achieving differential privacy
is to add Laplace noise [6], [3], [7] to the original
results. McSherry and Talwar [12] give an alterna-
tive method to implement differential privacy based
on the probability of a returned result, called the
exponential mechanism. Roth and Roughgarden [13]
proposes a median mechanism which improves upon
the Laplace mechanism. McSherry implemented the
interactive data access mechanism into PINQ [11], a
platform providing a programming interface through
a SQL-like language.
A few works started addressing non-interactive
data release that achieves differential privacy. Blum
et al. [9] proved the possibility of non-interactive data
release satisfying differential privacy for queries with
polynomial VC-dimension, such as predicate queries.
It also proposed an inefficient algorithm based on the
exponential mechanism. The result largely remains
theoretical and the general algorithm is inefficient for
the complexity and required data size. [10] further
proposed more efficient algorithms with hardness
results obtained and it remains a key open problem
to find efficient algorithms for non-interactive data re-
lease with differential privacy for many domains. [14]
pointed out that a natural approach to side-stepping
the hardness is relaxing the utility requirement, and
not requiring accuracy for every input database.
Several recent work studied differentially private
mechanisms for particular kinds of data such as
search logs [15], [16] or set-valued data [17]. Others
proposed algorithms for specific applications or op-
timization goals such as recommender systems [18],
record linkage [19], data mining [20], or differentially
private data cubes with minimized overall cuboid
error [21]. It is important to note that [19] uses several
tree strategies including kd-tree in its partitioning step
3and our results show that our 2-phase uniformity-
driven kd-tree strategy achieves better utility for ran-
dom count queries.
A few works considered releasing data for predic-
tive count queries and are closely related to ours.
X. Xiao et al. [22] developed an algorithm using
wavelet transforms. [23] generates differentially pri-
vate histograms for single dimensional range queries
through a hierarchical partitioning approach and a
consistency check technique. [24] proposes a query
matrix mechanism that generates an optimal query
strategy based on the query workload of linear count
queries and further mapped the work in [22] and [23]
as special query strategies that can be represented
by a query matrix. It is worth noting that the cell-
based partitioning in our approach is essentially the
identity query matrix referred in [24]. While we will
leverage the query matrix framework to formally
analyze our approach, it is important to note that the
above mentioned query strategies are data-oblivious
in that they are determined by the query workload, a
static wavelet matrix, or hierarchical matrix without
taking into consideration the underlying data. On the
other hand, our 2-phase kd-tree based partitioning
is designed to explicitly exploit the smoothness of
the underlying data indirectly observed by the dif-
ferentially private interface and the final query matrix
corresponding to the released histogram is dependent
on the approximate data distribution. We are also
aware of a forthcoming work [25] and will compare
with it as the proceedings becomes available.
In summary, our work complements and advances
the above works in that we focus on differentially
private histogram release for random query workload
using a multidimensional partitioning approach that
is “data-aware”. Sharing the insights from [14], [17],
our primary viewpoint is that it is possible and desir-
able in practice to design adaptive or data-dependent
heuristic mechanisms for differentially private data
release for useful families or subclasses of databases
and applications. Our approach provides formal util-
ity guarantees for a class of queries and also supports
a variety of applications including general OLAP,
classification and record linkage.
3 PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we formally introduce the definitions
of differential privacy, the data model and the queries
we consider, as well as a formal utility notion called
(, δ)-usefulness. Matrices and vectors are indicated
with bold letters (e.g H, x) and their elements are
indicated as Hij or xi. While we will introduce
mathematical notations in this section and subsequent
sections, Table 3 lists the frequently-used symbols for
references.
TABLE 1
Frequently used symbols
Symbol Description
n number of records in the dataset
m number of cells in the data cube
xi original count of cell i(1 ≤ i ≤ m)
yi released count of cell i in cell histogram
yp released count of partition p in subcube histogram
np size of partition p
s size of query range
α, α1, α2 differential privacy parameters
γ smoothness parameter
3.1 Differential Privacy
Definition 3.1 (α-Differential privacy [7]): In the in-
teractive model, an access mechanism A satisfies α-
differential privacy if for any neighboring databases1
D1 and D2, for any query function Q, r ⊆ Range(Q),
AQ(D) is the mechanism to return an answer to query
Q(D),
Pr[AQ(D1) = r] ≤ eαPr[AQ(D2) = r]
In the non-interactive model, a data release mecha-
nism A satisfies α-differential privacy if for all neigh-
boring database D1 and D2, and released output Dˆ,
Pr[A(D1) = Dˆ] ≤ eαPr[A(D2) = Dˆ]
Laplace Mechanism. To achieve differential privacy,
we use the Laplace mechanism [6] that adds random
noise of Laplace distribution to the true answer of a
query Q, AQ(D) = Q(D)+ N˜ , where N˜ is the Laplace
noise. The magnitude of the noise depends on the
privacy level and the query’s sensitivity.
Definition 3.2 (Sensitivity): For arbitrary neighbor-
ing databases D1 and D2, the sensitivity of a query Q,
denoted by SQ, is the maximum difference between
the query results of D1 and D2,
SQ = max|Q(D1)−Q(D2)| (1)
To achieve α-differential privacy for a given query
Q on dataset D, it is sufficient to return Q(D) + N˜ in
place of the original result Q(D) where we draw N˜
from Lap(SQ/α) [6].
Composition. The composability of differential pri-
vacy [11] ensures privacy guarantees for a sequence
of differentially-private computations. For a general
series of analysis, the privacy parameter values add
up, i.e. the privacy guarantees degrade as we expose
more information. In a special case that the analyses
operate on disjoint subsets of the data, the ultimate
privacy guarantee depends only on the worst of the
guarantees of each analysis, not the sum.
1. We use the definition of unbounded neighboring databases
[8] consistent with [11] which treats the databases as multisets of
records and requires their symmetric difference to be 1.
4Theorem 3.1 (Sequential Composition [11]): Let Mi
each provide αi-differential privacy. The sequence of
Mi provides (
∑
i αi)-differential privacy.
Theorem 3.2 (Parallel Composition [11]): If Di are dis-
joint subsets of the original database and Mi provides
α-differential privacy for each Di, then the sequence
of Mi provides α-differential privacy.
Differential Privacy Interface. A privacy interface
such as PINQ [11] can be used to provide a differ-
entially private interface to a database. It provides
operators for database aggregate queries such as
count (NoisyCount) and sum (NoisySum) which uses
Laplace noise and the exponential mechanism to en-
force differential privacy. It also provides a Partition
operator that can partition the dataset based on the
provided set of candidate keys. The Partition operator
takes advantage of parallel composition and thus the
privacy costs do not add up.
3.2 Data and Query Model
Data Model. Consider a dataset with N nominal or
discretized attributes, we use an N -dimensional data
cube, also called a base cuboid in the data ware-
housing literature [26], [21], to represent the aggregate
information of the data set. The records are the points
in the N -dimensional data space. Each cell of a data
cube represents an aggregated measure, in our case,
the count of the data points corresponding to the
multidimensional coordinates of the cell. We denote
the number of cells by m and m = |dom(A1)| ∗ · · · ∗
|dom(AN )| where |dom(Ai)| is the domain size of
attribute Ai. We use the term “partition” to refer to
any sub-cube in the data cube.
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ID Age Income
1 20~30 10~20K
2 30~40 30K
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n 30~40 60K
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Fig. 2. Running example: original data represented in
a relational table (left) and a 2-dimensional count cube
(right)
Figure 2 shows an example relational dataset with
attribute age and income (left) and a two-dimensional
count data cube or histogram (right). The domain val-
ues of age are 20∼30, 30∼40 and 40∼50; the domain
values of income are 0∼10K, 10K∼20K and > 20K.
Each cell in the data cube represents the population
count corresponding to the age and income values.
Query Model. We consider linear counting queries
that compute a linear combination of the count values
in the data cube based on a query predicate. We can
represent the original data cube, e.g. the counts of all
cells, by an m-dimensional column vector x shown
below.
x =
[
10 21 37 20 0 0 53 0 0
]T
Definition 3.3 (Linear query [24]): A linear query Q
can be represented as an m-dimensional boolean vec-
tor Q = [q1 . . . qn] with each qi ∈ R. The answer to a
linear query Q on data vector x is the vector product
Qx = q1x1 + · · ·+ qnxn.
In this paper, we consider counting queries with
boolean predicates so that each qi is a boolean variable
with value 0 or 1. The sensitivity of the counting
queries, based on equation (1), is SQ = 1. We denote
s as the query range size or query size, which is the
number of cells contained in the query predicate, and
we have s = |Q|. For example, a query Q1 asking
the population count with age = [20, 30] and income
> 30k, corresponding to x1, is shown as a query
vector in Figure 3. The size of this query is 1. It also
shows the original answer of Q1 and a perturbed
answer with Laplace noise that achieves α-differential
privacy. We note that the techniques and proofs are
generalizable to real number query vectors.
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Fig. 3. Example: a linear counting query
Definition 3.4 (Query matrix [24]): A query matrix is
a collection of linear queries, arranged by rows to
form an p×m matrix.
Given a p × m query matrix H, the query answer
for H is a length-p column vector of query results,
which can be computed as the matrix product Hx.
For example, an m×m identity query matrix Im will
result in a length-m column vector consisting of all
the cell counts in the original data vector x.
A data release algorithm, consisting of a sequence
of designed queries using the differential privacy in-
terface, can be represented as a query matrix. We will
use this query matrix representation in the analysis of
our algorithms.
3.3 Utility Metrics
We formally analyze the utility of the released data
by the notion of (, δ)-usefulness [9].
Definition 3.5 ((, δ)-usefulness [9]): A database
mechanism A is (, δ)-useful for queries in class C if
with probability 1 − δ, for every Q ∈ C, and every
database D, A(D) = Dˆ, |Q(Dˆ)−Q(D)| ≤ .
5In this paper, we mainly focus on linear counting
queries to formally analyze the released histograms.
We will discuss and experimentally show how the
released histogram can be used to support other types
of OLAP queries such as sum and average and other
applications such as classification.
3.4 Laplace Distribution Properties
We include a general lemma on probability distribu-
tion and a theorem on the statistical distribution of
the summation of multiple Laplace noises, which we
will use when analyzing the utility of our algorithms.
Lemma 3.1: If Z ∼ f(z), then aZ ∼ 1af(z/a) where
a is any constant.
Theorem 3.3: [27] Let fn(z, α) be the PDF of∑n
i=1 N˜i(α) where N˜i(α) are i.i.d. Laplace noise
Lap(1/α),
fn(z, α) =
αn
2nΓ2(n)
exp(−α|z|)
∫ ∞
0
vn−1(|z|+ v
2α
)n−1e−vdv (2)
4 MULTIDIMENSIONAL PARTITIONING
4.1 Motivation and Overview
For differentially private histogram release, a multi-
dimensional histogram on a set of attributes is con-
structed by partitioning the data points into mutually
disjoint subsets called buckets or partitions. The counts
or frequencies in each bucket is then released. Any ac-
cess to the original database is conducted through the
differential privacy interface to guarantee differential
privacy. The histogram can be then used to answer
random counting queries and other types of queries.
The partitioning strategy will largely determine the
utility of the released histogram to arbitrary counting
queries. Each partition introduces a bounded Laplace
noise or perturbation error by the differential privacy
interface. If a query predicate covers multiple parti-
tions, the perturbation error is aggregated. If a query
predicate falls within a partition, the result has to be
estimated assuming certain distribution of the data
points in the partition. The dominant approach in
histogram literature is making the uniform distribution
assumption, where the frequencies of records in the
bucket are assumed to be the same and equal to the
average of the actual frequencies [28]. This introduces
an approximation error.
Example. We illustrate the errors and the impact of
different partitioning strategies through an example
shown in Figure 4. Consider the data in Figure 2. As
a baseline strategy, we could release a noisy count
for each of the cells. In a data-aware strategy, as if
we know the original data, the 4 cells, x5, x6, x8, x9,
can be grouped into one partition and we release a
single noisy count for the partition. Note that the noise
are independently generated for each cell or partition.
Because the sensitivity of the counting query is 1 and
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Fig. 4. Baseline strategy vs. data-aware strategy
the partitioning only requires parallel composition of
differential privacy, the magnitude of the noise in
the two approaches are the same. Consider a query,
count(x5), asking the count of data points in the
region x5. For the baseline strategy, the query error
is N˜ which only consists of the perturbation error.
For the data-aware strategy, the best estimate for the
answer based on the uniform distribution assumption
is 0 + N˜/4. So the query error is N˜/4. In this case,
the approximation error is 0 because the cells in the
partition are indeed uniform. If not, approximation
error will be introduced. In addition, the perturbation
error is also amortized among the cells. Clearly, the
data-aware strategy is desired in this case.
In general, a finer-grained partitioning will intro-
duce smaller approximation errors but larger aggre-
gated perturbation errors. Finding the right balance
to minimize the overall error for a random query
workload is a key question. Not surprisingly, finding
the optimal multi-dimensional histogram, even with-
out the privacy constraints, is a challenging problem
and optimal partitioning even in two dimensions is
NP-hard [29]. Motivated by the above example and
guided by the composition theorems, we summarize
our two design goals: 1) generate uniform or close
to uniform partitions so that the approximation error
within the partitions is minimized, essentially gen-
erating a v-optimal histogram [30]; 2) carefully and
efficiently use the privacy budget to minimize the
perturbation error. In this paper, we first study the
most fine-grained cell-based partitioning as a base-
line strategy, which results in a equi-width histogram
and does not introduce approximation error but only
perturbation error. We then propose a 2-phase kd-
tree (k-dimensional tree) based partitioning strategy
that results in an v-optimal histogram and seeks to
minimize both the perturbation and approximation
error.
4.2 A Baseline Cell Partitioning Strategy
A simple strategy is to partition the data based on the
domain and then release a noisy count for each cell
which results in a equi-width cell histogram. Figure 5
illustrate this baseline strategy. The implementation is
quite simple, taking advantage the Partition operator
6followed by NoisyCount on each partition, shown in
Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 5. Baseline cell partitioning
Algorithm 1 Baseline cell partitioning algorithm
Require: α: differential privacy budget
1. Partition the data based on all domains.
2. Release NoisyCount of each partition using pri-
vacy parameter α
Privacy Guarantee. We present the theorem below for
the cell partitioning algorithm which can be derived
directly from the composibility theorems.
Theorem 4.1: Algorithm 1 achieves α-differential
privacy.
Proof: Because every cell is a disjoint subset of
the original database, according to theorem 3.2, it’s
α-differentially private.
Error Quantification. We present a lemma followed
by a theorem that states a formal utility guarantee of
cell-based partitioning for linear distributive queries.
Lemma 4.1: If N˜i (i = 1 . . .m) is a set of random
variables i.i.d from Lap(b) with mean 0, given 0 <
 < 1, the following holds:
Pr[
m∑
i=1
|N˜i| ≤ ] ≥ 1−m · exp(− 
mb
) (3)
Proof: Let 1 = /m, given the Laplace distribu-
tion, we have
Pr[|N˜i| > 1] = 2
∫∞
1
1
2bexp(−xb ) = e−1/b
then
Pr[|N˜i| ≤ 1] = 1 - Pr[|N˜i| > 1] = 1− e−1/b
If each |N˜i| ≤ 1, we have
∑m
i=1 |N˜i| ≤ m · 1 = , so
we have
Pr[
m∑
i=1
|N˜i| ≤ ] ≥ Pr[|N˜i| ≤ 1]m = (1− e−1/b)m
Let F (x) = (1− x)m +mx− 1. The derivative of F (x)
is F ′(x) = −m(1− x)m−1 +m = m(1− (1− x)m−1) ≥
0 when 0 < x < 1. Note that 0 < e−1/b < 1, so
F (e−1/b) ≥ F (0) = 0. We get
(1− e−1/b)m ≥ 1−m · e−1/b
Recall 1 = /m, we derive equation (3).
Theorem 4.2: The released Dˆ of algorithm 1 main-
tains (, δ)-usefulness for linear counting queries, if
α ≥ m·ln(mδ ) , where m is the number of cells in the
data cube.
Proof: Given original data D represented as count
vector x, using the cell partitioning with Laplace
mechanism, the released data Dˆ can be represented
as y = x + N˜, where N˜ is a length-m column vector
of Laplace noises drawn from Lap(b) with b = 1/α.
Given a linear counting query Q represented as q
with query size s (s ≤ m), we have Q(D) = qx, and
Q(Dˆ) = Qy = Qx + QN˜ = Qx +
s∑
i=1
|N˜i|
With Lemma 4.1, we have
Pr[|Q(D)−Q(Dˆ)| ≤ ] = Pr[
s∑
i=1
|N˜i| ≤ ] ≥ 1−m·exp(− 
mb
)
If m · exp(− mb ) ≤ δ, then
Pr[|Q(x,D)−Q(x, Dˆ)| ≤ ] ≥ 1− δ
In order for m · exp(− mb ) ≤ δ, given b = 1/α, we
derive the condition α ≥ m·ln(mδ ) .
4.3 DPCube: Two-Phase Partitioning
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Fig. 6. DPCube: 2-phase partitioning
We now present our DPCube algorithm. DPCube
uses an innovative two-phase partitioning strategy
as shown in Figure 6. First, a cell based partition-
ing based on the domains (not the data) is used to
generate a fine-grained equi-width cell histogram (as
in the baseline strategy), which gives an approxima-
tion of the original data distribution. We generate a
synthetic database Dc based on the cell histogram.
Second, a multi-dimensional kd-tree based partition-
ing is performed on Dc to obtain uniform or close to
uniform partitions. The resulting partitioning keys are
used to Partition the original database and obtain a
NoisyCount for each of the partitions, which results
in a v-optimal histogram [30]. Finally, given a user-
issued query, an estimation component uses either the
v-optimal histogram or both histograms to compute
an answer. The key innovation of our algorithm is
7that it is data-aware or adaptive because the multi-
dimensional kd-tree based partitioning is based on the
cell-histogram from the first phase and hence exploits
the underlying data distribution indirectly observed
by the perturbed cell-histogram. Essentially, the kd-
tree is based on an approximate distribution of the
original data. The original database is not queried
during the kd-tree construction which saves the pri-
vacy budget. The overall privacy budget is efficiently
used and divided between the two phases only for
querying the NoisyCount for cells and partitions.
Algorithm 2 presents a sketch of the algorithm.
The key step in Algorithm 2 is the multi-
dimensional partitioning step. It uses a kd-tree based
space partitioning strategy that seeks to produce close
to uniform partitions in order to minimize the es-
timation error within a partition. It starts from the
root node which covers the entire space. At each
step, a splitting dimension and a split value from
the range of the current partition on that dimen-
sion are chosen heuristically to divide the space into
subspaces. The algorithm repeats until a pre-defined
requirement are met. In contrast to traditional kd-tree
index construction which desires a balanced tree, our
main design goal is to generate uniform or close to
uniform partitions so that the approximation error
within the partitions is minimized. Thus we propose
a uniformity based heuristic to make the decision
whether to split the current partition and to select
the best splitting point. There are several metrics
that can be used to measure the uniformity of a
partition such as information entropy and variance.
In our experiments, we use variance as the metric.
Concretely, we do not split a partition if its variance is
greater than a threshold, i.e. it is close to uniform, and
split it otherwise. In order to select the best splitting
point, we choose the dimension with the largest range
and the splitting point that minimizes the accumu-
lative weighted variance of resulting partitions. This
heuristic is consistent with the goal of a v-optimal
histogram which places the histogram bucket bound-
aries to minimize the cumulative weighted variance
of the buckets. Algorithm 3 describes the step 2 of
Algorithm 2.
Privacy Guarantee. We present the theorem below
for the 2-phase partitioning algorithm which can be
derived directly from the composibility theorems.
Theorem 4.3: Algorithm 2 is α-differentially private.
Proof: Step 2 and Step 5 are α1,α2-differentially
private. So the sequence is α-differentially private
because of theorem 3.1 with α = α1 + α2.
Query Matrix Representation. We now illustrate how
the proposed algorithm can be represented as a query
matrix. We denote H as the query matrix generating
the released data in our algorithm and we have H =
[HII;HI], where HI and HII correspond to the query
matrix in the cell partitioning and kd-tree partitioning
Algorithm 2 2-phase partitioning algorithm
Require: β: number of cells;
α: the overall privacy budget
Phase I:
1. Partition the original database based on all do-
mains.
2. get NoisyCount of each partition using privacy
parameter α1 and generate a synthetic dataset Dc.
Phase II:
3. Partition Dc by algorithm 3.
4. Partition the original database based on the
partition keys returned from step 3.
5. release NoisyCount of each partition using pri-
vacy parameter α2 = α− α1
Algorithm 3 Kd-tree based v-optimal partitioning
Require: Dt: input database; ξ0: variance threshold;
if variance of Dt > ξ0 then
Find a dimension and splitting point m which
minimizes the cumulative weighted variance of
the two resulting partitions;
Split Dt into Dt1 and Dt2 by m.
partition Dt1 and Dt2 by algorithm 3.
end if
phase respectively. HI is an Identity matrix with m
rows, each row querying the count of one cell. HII
contains all the partitions generated by the second
phase. We use N˜(α) to denote the column noise vector
and each noise N˜i is determined by a differential
privacy parameter (α1 in the first phase and α2 in
the second phase respectively). The released data is
y = Hx + N˜. It consists of the cell histogram yI in
phase I and the v-optimal histogram yI in phase II:
yI = (HI)x + N˜(α1), yII = (HII)x + N˜(α2).
Using our example data from Figure 2, the query
matrix H consisting of HI and HII and the released
data consisting of the cell histogram yI and subcube
histogram yII are shown in Equation (4, 5). The his-
tograms are also illustrated in Figure 7.
HI =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 yI =

10 + N˜1(α1)
21 + N˜2(α1)
37 + N˜3(α1)
20 + N˜4(α1)
0 + N˜5(α1)
0 + N˜6(α1)
53 + N˜7(α1)
0 + N˜8(α1)
0 + N˜9(α1)

(4)
HII =
[
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
]
yII =
[
51 + N˜10(α2)
37 + N˜11(α2)
53 + N˜12(α2)
0 + N˜13(α2)
]
(5)
4.4 Query Estimation and Error Quantification
Once the histograms are released, given a random
user query, the estimation component will compute
an answer using the released histograms. We study
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Fig. 7. Example: released cell histogram (left) and
subcube histogram (right)
two techniques and formally quantify and compare
the errors of the query answer they generate. The
first one estimates the query answer using only the
subcube histogram assuming a uniform distribution
within each partition. As an alternative approach, we
adopt the least squares (LS) method, also used in [24],
[23], to our two-phase strategy. The basic idea is to use
both cell histogram and subcube histogram and find
an approximate solution of the cell counts to resolve
the inconsistency between the two histograms.
Uniform Estimation using Subcube Histogram.
Based on our design goal to obtain uniform partitions
for the subcube histogram, we make the uniform dis-
tribution assumption in the subcube histogram, where
the counts in each cell within a partition are assumed
to be the same. Given a partition p, we denote np as
the size of the partition in number of cells. Hence the
count of each cell within this partition is yp/np where
yp is the noisy count of the partition. We denote xˆH
as the estimated cell counts of the original data. If a
query predicate falls within one single partition, the
estimated answer for that query is snp yp where s is
the query range size. Given a random linear query
that spans multiple partitions, we can add up the
estimated counts of all the partitions within the query
predicate. In the rest of the error analysis, we only
consider queries within one partition as the result can
be easily extended for the general case.
Figure 8 shows an example. Given a query Q2 on
population count with age = [30, 40], the original
answer is x2 + x5 + x8. Using the subcube histogram,
the query overlaps with partition y10 and partition y13.
Using the uniform estimation, the estimated answer
is y102 +
y13
2 .
Error Quantification for Uniform Estimation. We
derive the (, δ)-usefulness and the expected error for
the uniform estimation method. To formally under-
stand the distribution properties of input database
that guarantees the optimality of the method, we first
define the smoothness of the distribution within a
partition or database similar to [31]. The difference
is that [31] defines only the upper bound, while our
definition below defines the bound of differences of
all cell counts. Intuitively, the smaller the difference,
y11
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Fig. 8. Example: query estimation with uniform estima-
tion using subcube histogram
the smoother the distribution.
Definition 4.1 (γ-smoothness): Denote x the original
counts of cells in one partition, ∀xi, xj ∈ x, if |xj −
xi| ≤ γ, then the distribution in the partition satisfies
γ-smoothness.
We now present a theorem that formally analyzes
the utility of the released data if the input database
satisfies γ-smoothness, followed by a theorem for the
general case.
Theorem 4.4: For γ-smooth data x, given a query q
with size s, np the size of the partition, the uniform
estimation method is (, δ)-useful if equation (6) holds;
the upper bound of the expected absolute error E(H)
is shown in equation (7).
γ ≤ (+ s · logδ
α2np
)/min(s, np − s) (6)
E(H) ≤ γ[min(s, np − s)] + s
α2np
(7)
Proof: Given a query vector Q, the answer using
the original data is Qx, the estimated answer using
the released partition is snp yp where yp is the released
partition count, np is the partition size, and s is the
query size. The released count yp =
∑np
i=1 xi + N˜(α2).
So we have the absolute error as
H = | s
np
yp −Qx| = |( s
np
np∑
i=1
xi −Qx) + s
np
N˜(α2)|
According to the definition of γ-smoothness,
∀i, j, |xj − xi| ≤ γ, then | snp
∑np
i=1 xi − Qx| ≤
min(s, np − s)γ. Because of the symmetry of the PDF
of N˜(α2), we have
H ≤ |min(s, np − s)γ + s
np
N˜(α2)|
≤ min(s, np − s)γ + | s
np
N˜(α2)|
By Lemma 3.1, we know the PDF of snp N˜(α2). To
satisfy (, δ)-usefulness, we require Pr(H ≤ ) ≥ 1−δ,
then we derive the condition as in equation (6).
The expected absolute error is
E(H) =
s
np
np∑
i=1
xi −Qx + s
np
E|N˜(α2)|
≤ min(s, np − s)γ + s
np
E|N˜(α2)|
9Based on the PDF of snp N˜(α2), we have
E|N˜(α2)| = 1/α2
and hence derive equation (7).
From theorem 4.4, we can conclude that if the input
data is smoothly distributed or very sparse, γ would
be small, the error would be small. In this case, our
algorithm achieves the best result. In the general case,
if we do not know the distribution properties of the
input data, we present Theorem 4.5 to quantify the
error.
Theorem 4.5: Given a linear counting query Q, the
expected absolute error for the uniform estimation
method, E(H), is a function of (α1, s, η) shown in
equation (8):
E(H) =
∫
fs(z, α1)|η + z|dz (8)
where η = snp yp − QyI, yp is the released count of
the partition in the subcube histogram, np the size of
the partition, s is the size of the query, and yI is the
released counts of the cell histogram.
Proof: Given a query Q, the answer using the
original data is Qx, the estimated answer using the
released partition is snp yp. The released partition count
is yp =
∑np
i=1 xi + N˜(α2). The released cell counts for
the cell histogram in the first phase is yI = x+ N˜(α1).
So we have
H = | s
np
yp −Qx| = | s
np
yp −Q(yI − N˜(α1))|
= |( s
np
yp −QyI) +
s∑
i=1
N˜i(α1)|
Denote η = snp yp − QyI, which is the difference
(inconsistency) between the estimated answers using
the cell histogram and the subcube histogram, then
H = |η +
∑s
i=1 N˜i(α1)|. By equation (2) , we have
E(H) in equation (8).
Least Square Estimation using Cell Histogram and
Subcube Histogram. The least square (LS) method,
used in [24], [23], finds an approximate (least square)
solution of the cell counts that aims to resolve the
inconsistency between multiple differentially private
views. In our case, the cell histogram and the subcube
histogram provide two views. We derive the theoret-
ical error of the least square method and compare it
with the uniform estimation method. Note that the
error quantification in [24] is only applicable to the
case when α1 and α2 are equal. We derive new result
for the general case in which α1 and α2 may have
different values.
Theorem 4.6: Given a query Q, a least square esti-
mation xˆLS based on the cell histogram and subcube
histogram, the expected absolute error of the query
answer, E(LS), is a function of (α1, α2, np, s) in equa-
tion (9), where s is the size of Q, and np is the size of
the partition.
E(LS) =
(np + 1)
3
s2(np + 1− s)
·
∫
||
∫
fnp−s(−
(− z)(np + 1)
s
, α1)
·
∫
fs(
(z − y)(np + 1)
np + 1− s , α1)f1(
y(np + 1)
s
, α2)dydzd
(9)
Proof: Given our two phase query strategy, the
query matrix for the partition is H = [ones(1, np); Inp ],
where np is the partition size. Using the least square
method in [24], we solve H+ = (HTH)−1HT , we have
H+ =

1
np+1
np
np+1
− 1
np+1
− 1
np+1
· · · − 1
np+1
1
np+1
− 1
np+1
np
np+1
− 1
np+1
· · · − 1
np+1
1
np+1
− 1
np+1
− 1
np+1
np
np+1
· · · − 1
np+1
1
np+1
− 1
np+1
− 1
np+1
− 1
np+1
. . . − 1
np+1
1
np+1
− 1
np+1
− 1
np+1
− 1
np+1
· · · np
np+1

We compute the least square estimation based on the
released data y as xˆLS = H+y. So the query answer
using the estimation is
QxˆLS = QH+y = QH+(Hx+ N˜(α)) = Qx+QH+N˜(α)
The absolute error is
QxˆLS −Qx = s
np + 1
N˜(α2) +
np + 1− s
np + 1
s∑
i=1
N˜(α1)
− s
np + 1
np−s∑
i=1
N˜(α1)
By Lemma 3.1 and equation (2), we know the
PDF of snp+1N˜(α2),
np+1−s
np+1
∑s
i=1 N˜(α1) and
s
np+1
∑np−s
i=1 N˜(α1), then by convolution formula,
we have equation (9).
We will plot the above theoretical results for both
uniform estimation and least square estimation with
varying parameters in Section 6 and demonstrate the
benefit of the uniform estimation method, esp. when
data is smoothly distributed.
5 APPLICATIONS
Having presented the multidimensional partitioning
approach for differentially private histogram release,
we now briefly discuss the applications that the re-
leased histogram can support.
OLAP. On-line analytical processing (OLAP) is a key
technology for business-intelligence applications. The
computation of multidimensional aggregates, such as
count, sum, max, average, is the essence of on-line
analytical processing. The released histograms with
the estimation can be used to answer most common
OLAP aggregate queries.
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Classification. Classification is a common data anal-
ysis task. Several recent works studied classifica-
tion with differential privacy by designing classifier-
dependent algorithms (such as decision tree) [32], [33].
The released histograms proposed in this paper can
be also used as training data for training a classifier,
offering a classifier-independent approach for clas-
sification with differential privacy. To compare the
approach with existing solutions [32], [33], we have
chosen an ID3 tree classifier algorithm. However, the
histograms can be used as training data for any other
classifier.
Blocking for Record Linkage. Private record linkage
between datasets owned by distinct parties is another
common and challenging problem. In many situa-
tions, uniquely identifying information may not be
available and linkage is performed based on matching
of other information, such as age, occupation, etc.
Privacy preserving record linkage allows two par-
ties to identify the records that represent the same
real world entities without disclosing additional in-
formation other than the matching result. While Se-
cure Multi-party Computation (SMC) protocols can be
used to provide strong security and perfect accuracy,
it incurs prohibitive computational and communica-
tion cost in practice. Typical SMC protocols require
O(n ∗ m) cryptographic operations where n and m
correspond to numbers of records in two datasets.
In order to improve the efficiency of record linkage,
blocking is generally in use according to [34]. The pur-
pose of blocking is to divide a dataset into mutually
exclusive blocks assuming no matches occur across
different blocks. It reduces the number of record pairs
to compare for the SMC protocols but meanwhile
we need to devise a blocking scheme that provides
strong privacy guarantee. [19] has proposed a hy-
brid approach with a differentially private blocking
step followed by an SMC step. The differentially
private blocking step adopts tree-structured space
partitioning techniques and uses Laplace noise at
each partitioning step to preserve differential privacy.
The matching blocks are then sent to SMC protocols
for further matching of the record pairs within the
matching blocks which significantly reduces the total
number of pairs that need to be matched by SMC.
The released histograms in this paper can be also
used to perform blocking which enjoys differential
privacy. Our experiments show that we can achieve
approximately optimal reduction ratio of the pairs
that need to be matched by SMC with appropriate
setting for the threshold ξ0. We will examine some
empirical results in Section 6.
6 EXPERIMENT
We first simulate and compare the theoretical query
error results from Section 4.4 for counting queries that
falls within one partition to show the properties and
benefits of our approach (Section 6.1). We then present
a set of experimental evaluations of the quality of
the released histogram in terms of weighted variance
(Section 6.2), followed by evaluations of query error
against random linear counting queries and a com-
parison with existing solutions (Section 6.3). Finally,
we also implemented and experimentally evaluate
the two additional applications using the released
histograms, classification and blocking for record link-
age, and show the benefit of our approach (Section
6.4).
6.1 Simulation Plots of Theoretical Results
As some of the theoretical results in Section 4.4 con-
sists of equations that are difficult to compute for
given parameters, we use the simulation approach to
show the results and the impact of different param-
eters in this section. Detailed and sophisticated tech-
niques about the simulation approach can be found
in [35] and [36]. Table 6.1 shows the parameters used
in the simulation experiment and their default values.
TABLE 2
Simulation parameters
parameter description default value
np partition size np = 11
s query size s ≤ np
α1, α2 diff. privacy parameters α1 = 0.05, α2 = 0.15
γ smoothness parameter γ = 5
η inconsistency between η = 5
cell and subcube histogram
Metric. We evaluate the error of absolute count
queries. Recall that E(LS) is the expected error of
the least square estimation method; max(E(H)) is the
upper bound of expected error of the uniform esti-
mation method when the data is γ-smooth; E(H) is
the expected error of the uniform estimation method
in the general case. Note that E(LS), max(E(H)),
and E(H) are derived from equation (9), (7), (8)
respectively.
Impact of Query Size. We first study the impact
of the query size. Figure 9 shows the error of the
uniform and least square solutions with respect to
varying query size for γ-smooth data and general case
(any distribution) respectively. We can see that the
highest error appears when the query size s is half
of the partition size np. When γ is small, i.e. data is
smoothly distributed, the uniform estimation method
outperforms the least square method. In the general
case when we do not have any domain knowledge
about the data distribution, it is beneficial to use both
cell histogram and subcube histogram to resolve their
inconsistencies.
Impact of Privacy Budget Allocation. We now study
the impact of the allocation of the overall differen-
tial privacy budget α between the two phases. The
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Fig. 9. Query error vs. query size s
overall budget is fixed with α = 0.2. Figure 10 shows
the error of the uniform and least square solutions
with respect to varying query size for γ-smooth data
and general case (any distribution) respectively. For
the LS method, equally dividing α between the two
phases or slightly more for cell-based partitioning
works better than other cases. The results for the
uniform estimation method present interesting trends.
For smoothly distributed data, a smaller privacy bud-
get for the partitioning phase yields better result.
Intuitively, since data is smoothly distributed, it is
beneficial to save the privacy budget for the second
phase to get a more accurate overall partition count.
On the contrary, for the random case, it is beneficial
to spend the privacy budget in the first phase to get
a more accurate cell counts, and hence more accurate
partitioning.
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Fig. 10. Query error vs. privacy budget allocation α1
Impact of Partition Size. For γ-smooth data, the
expected error is dependent on the partition size np
and the smoothness level γ. Figure 11(a) shows the
error of the uniform and least square solutions with
respect to varying partition size np for γ-smooth data.
We observe that the error increases when the partition
size increases because of the increasing approximation
error within the partition. Therefore, a good partition-
ing algorithm should avoid large partitions.
Impact of Data Smoothness. For γ-smooth data,
we study the impact of the smoothness level γ on
the error bound for the uniform estimation method.
Figure 11(b) shows the maximum error bound with
varying γ. We can see that the more smooth the data,
the less error for released data. Note that the query
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Fig. 11. Query error for γ-smooth distribution
size s is set to be nearly half size of the partition
size np as default, which magnifies the impact of the
smoothness. We observed in other parameter settings
that the error increases only slowly for queries with
small or big query sizes.
Impact of Inconsistency. For data with any (un-
known) distribution, E(H) is a function of η, the level
of inconsistency between the cell histogram and the
subcube histogram. In contrast to the the γ-smooth
case in which we have a prior knowledge about
the smoothness of the data, here we only have this
observed level of inconsistency from the released data
which reflects the smoothness of the original data.
Figure 12 shows the error for the uniform estimation
method with varying η. Note that the error increases
with increasing η and even when η = 10, the error
is still lager than the error of least square method in
Figure 11.
20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
η
Er
ro
r
 
 
E(εH)
Fig. 12. Query error vs. level of inconsistency η for any
distribution
6.2 Histogram Variance
We use the Adult dataset from the Census [37].
All experiments were run on a computer with Intel
P8600(2∗2.4 GHz) CPU and 2GB memory. For compu-
tation simplicity and smoothness of data distribution,
we only use the first 104 data records.
Original and Released Histograms. We first present
some example histograms generated by our algorithm
for the Census dataset. Figure 13(a) shows the original
2-dimensional histogram on Age and Income. Figure
13(b) shows a cell histogram generated in the first
phase with α1 = 0.05. Figure 13(c) shows a subcube
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histogram generated in the second phase with esti-
mated cell counts using uniform estimation, in which
each horizontal plane represents one partition. Figure
13(d) shows an estimated cell histogram using the LS
estimation using both cell histogram and subcube his-
togram. We systematically evaluate the utility of the
released subcube histogram with uniform estimation
below.
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Fig. 13. Original and released histograms
Metric. We now evaluate the quality of the released
histogram using an application-independent metric,
the weighted variance of the released subcube his-
togram. Ideally, our goal is to obtain a v-optimal
histogram which minimizes the weighted variance so
as to minimize the estimation error within partitions.
Formally, the weighted variance of a histogram is
defined as V =
∑p
i=1 xiVi, where p is the number
of partitions, xi is the number of data points in
the i-th partition, and Vi is the variance in the i-th
partition [30].
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Fig. 14. Histogram variance and impact of parameters
Impact of Variance Threshold. Figure 14(a) shows the
weighted variance of the released subcube histogram
with respect to varying variance threshold value ξ0
used in our algorithm. As expected, when ξ0 becomes
large, less partitioning is performed, i.e. more data
points are grouped into one bucket, which increases
the variance.
Impact of Privacy Budget Allocation. Figure 14(b)
shows the weighted variance with respect to varying
privacy budget in the first phase α1 (with fixed ξ0.
Note that the overall privacy budget is fixed. We see
that the correlation is not very clear due to the ran-
domness of noises. Also the ξ0 is fixed which does not
reflect the different magnitude of noise introduced by
different α1. Generally speaking, the variance should
decrease gradually when α1 increases because large
α1 will introduce less noise to the first phase, which
will lead to better partitioning quality.
6.3 Query Error
We evaluate the quality of the released histogram
using random linear counting queries and measure
the average absolute query error and compare the
results with other algorithms. We use the Age and
Income attributes and generated 105 random count-
ing queries to calculate the average query error. The
random queries consist of two range predicates on
the two attributes respectively. We also implemented
an alternative kd-tree strategy similar to that used in
[19], referred to as hierarchical kd-tree, and another
data release algorithm [23], referred to as consistency
check, for comparison purposes.
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Fig. 15. Query error and impact of parameters
Impact of Variance Threshold. We first evaluate the
impact of the threshold value ξ0 on query error. Figure
15(a) shows the average absolute query error with
respect to varying threshold values. Consistent with
Figure 14, we observe that the query error increases
with an increasing threshold value, due to the in-
creased variance within partitions.
Impact of Privacy Budget Allocation. We next eval-
uate the impact of how to allocate the overall privacy
budget α into α1, α2 for the two phases in the
algorithm. Figure 15(b) shows the average absolute
query error vs. varying α1. We observe that small α1
values yield better results, which complies with our
theoretical result for γ-smooth data in figure 10. This
verifies that the real life Adult dataset has a somewhat
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smooth distribution. On the other hand, for data with
unknown distribution, we expect α1 cannot be too
small as it is more important for generating a more
accurate partitioning.
Comparison with Other Works. We compare our
approach with two representative approaches in ex-
isting works, the hierarchical kd-tree strategy used in
[19], and the hierarchical partitioning with consistency
check in [23]. Figure 16 shows the average abso-
lute query error of different approaches with respect
to varying privacy budget α. We can see that the
DPCube algorithm achieves best utility against the
random query workload because of its efficient 2-
phase use of the privacy budget and the v-optimal
histogram.
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Fig. 16. Query error for different approaches
We also experimented with query workloads with
different query sizes for the DPCube approach and the
consistency check approach to closely examine their
differences. Figure 16(b) shows the average absolute
query error with respect to varying query sizes for
the two approaches. Note that the query size is in log
scale. As proven in our theoretical result in Figure
11, the query error of our algorithm would increase
with increasing query size. We can see that for queries
with reasonable sizes, our 2-phase algorithm achieves
better results than the consistency check algorithm.
On the other hand, the consistency check algorithm is
beneficial for large size queries because our algorithm
favors smaller partitions with small variances which
will result in large aggregated perturbation errors for
large queries that spans multiple partitions.
6.4 Additional Applications
Classification. We evaluate the utility of the released
histogram for classification and compare it with other
differentially private classification algorithms. In this
experiment, the dataset is divided into training and
test subsets with 30162 and 15060 records respectively.
We use the work class, martial status, race, and sex
attributes as features. The class was represented by
salary attribute with two possible values indicating if
the salary is greater than $50k or not.
For this experiment, we compare several classifiers.
As a baseline, we trained a ID3 classifier from the orig-
inal data using Weka [38]. We also adapted the Weka
ID3 implementation such that it can use histogram as
its input. To test the utility of the differentially private
histogram generated from our algorithm, we used
it to train an ID3 classifier called DPCube histogram
ID3. As a comparison, we implemented an interactive
differentially private ID3 classifier, private interactive
ID3, introduced by Friedman et al. [33].
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Fig. 17. Classification accuracy vs. privacy budget α
Figure 17 shows the classification accuracy of the
different classifiers with respect to varying privacy
budget α. The original ID3 classifier provides a base-
line accuracy at 76.9%. The DPCube ID3 achieves
slightly worse but comparable accuracy than the base-
line due to the noise. While both the DPCube ID3
and the private interactive ID3 achieve better accu-
racy with increasing privacy budget as expected, our
DPCube ID3 outperforms the private interactive ID3
due to its efficient use of the privacy budget.
Blocking for Record linkage. We also evaluated the
utility of the released histogram for record linkage
and compared our method against the hierarchical kd-
tree scheme from [19]. The attributes we considered
for this experiment are: age, education, wage, marital
status, race and sex. As the histogram is used for the
blocking step and all pairs of records in matching
blocks will be further linked using an SMC protocol,
our main goal is to reduce the total number of pairs
of records in matching blocks in order to reduce the
SMC cost. We use the reduction ratio used in [19] as
our evaluation metric. It is defined as follows:
reduction ratio = 1−
∑k
i=1 ni ∗mi
n ∗m (10)
where ni (mi) corresponds to the number of records
in dataset 1 (resp. 2) that fall into the ith block, and
k is the total number of blocks.
We compared both methods by running experi-
ments with varying privacy budget (α) values (using
the first 2 attributes of each record) and with varying
numbers of attributes (with α fixed to 0.1). Figure
18(a) shows the reduction ratio with varying privacy
budget. Both methods exhibit an increasing trend
in reduction ratio as the privacy budget grows but
our 2-phase v-optimal histogram consistently outper-
forms the hierarchical kd-tree approach and maintains
a steady reduction ratio around 85%. Figure 18(b)
14
shows the reduction ratio with varying number of
attributes (dimensions). As the number of attributes
increases, both methods show a drop in the reduction
ration due to the sparsification of data points, thus
increasing the relative error for each cell/partition.
However, our DPCube approach exhibits desirable ro-
bustness when the dimensionality increases compared
to the hierarchical kd-tree approach.
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Fig. 18. Reduction ratio of blocking for record linkage
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We have presented a two-phase multidimensional
partitioning algorithm with estimation algorithms for
differentially private histogram release. We formally
analyzed the utility of the released histograms and
quantified the errors for answering linear counting
queries. We showed that the released v-optimal his-
togram combined with a simple query estimation
scheme achieves bounded query error and supe-
rior utility than existing approaches for “smoothly”
distributed data. The experimental results on using
the released histogram for random linear counting
queries and additional applications including classi-
fication and blocking for record linkage showed the
benefit of our approach. As future work, we plan to
develop algorithms that are both data- and workload-
aware to boost the accuracy for specific workloads
and investigate the problem of releasing histograms
for temporally changing data.
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